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A TRIBUNAL’S MANIFEST EXCESS OF POWERS:
AN EXAMINATION OF BIT PRECLUSION
By
Melody Mahla*
I.

INTRODUCTION
Faced with a financial crisis in 1989, Argentina instituted several

privatization efforts in an attempt to resuscitate its floundering national economy.1
A second fiscal downturn forced the Argentine government to rescind these
privatization schemes in 2001.2 Sempra Energy International (“Sempra”), an
American company that had capitalized on Argentina’s economic revitalization
attempts by investing in several of Argentina’s natural gas providers, challenged
Argentina’s bailout efforts and invoked arbitration proceedings, insisting that
Argentina had violated the Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between Argentina
and the United States.3 The arbitrational tribunal (“Tribunal”) agreed and issued a
$75 million award in Sempra’s favor.4 On January 25, 2008, the Republic of
Argentina (“Argentina”) submitted a request with the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) for the annulment of the Tribunal’s
award.5 In its request for annulment, Argentina insisted that the Tribunal had been
improperly constituted, had “manifestly exceeded its powers,” had violated a
fundamental procedural rule, and had failed to provide an adequate explanation for
its decisions.6 Upon ICSID’s granting of a provisional stay of enforcement of the

*

Melody Mahla is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law.
1
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the
Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the Award of June 29, 2010 (Mr. Christer
Soderlund, Sir David A.O. Edward, QC, Ambassador Andreas J. Jacovides) [hereinafter
Sempra].
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See id. at 7.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
Id. at 1.
6
Sempra at n.1 at 8.
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Tribunal’s Award, an ad hoc committee was convened to deliberate over
Argentina’s annulment application.7 In ultimately determining that the Tribunal
had “made a fundamental error in identifying and applying” the relevant law, the
ad hoc committee held that the Tribunal had exercised a “manifest excess of
powers” and annulled its Award.8
II.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 1989, Argentina implemented a privatization scheme in an effort to

stimulate its struggling economy.9 Coupled with this initiative was the
Convertibility Law of 1991, which afforded the Argentine peso (“ARS”) a one-toone exchange rate with the United States Dollar (“USD”).10 In effect, the
privatization program incentivized the reorganization of Argentina’s natural gas
industry in 1992, resulting in the creation of several major residential and
commercial gas distributors.11 Sempra, an American corporation, invested in two
of these newly formed Argentinean gas companies, Sodigas Pampeana and
Sodigas Sur, and acquired 43.09% of both distributors’ shares.12 These particular
companies controlled 90% and 86.09%, respectively, of shares in two Argentine
companies, Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A. and Camuzzi Gas del Sur (together,
“Licensees”), which were conferred licenses for the provision of natural gas in
1996.13
Faced with yet another financial crisis in 2001, the Argentine Government
acted quickly to ratify the Emergency Act of January 2002, essentially dissolving
the Convertibility Law of 1991 while simultaneously phasing out the USD and

7

See id. at 1.
Id. at 44.
9
See id. at 6.
10
See id.
11
Sempra at n.1 at 7.
12
See id.
13
See id.
8
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reintroducing an ARS-based economy.14 Sempra took exception to many of
Argentina’s bail-out measures, asserting that the revocation of the “Licensees’
entitlement to calculation of tariffs in USD and their semi-annual adjustment on
the basis of the US Producer Price Index (“PPI”)” was tantamount to a “wholesale
abrogation and repudiation of significant rights and entitlements” that the
Licensees and Sempra had enjoyed under Argentina’s previously privatized
regulatory environment.15 Consequently, Sempra filed a Request for Arbitration
under the ICSID Convention, “invoking the US-Argentina Bilateral Investment
Treaty (“BIT”)” on September 11, 2002.

16

Argentina raised various jurisdictional

objections; however, the ICSID Tribunal ultimately determined that the dispute
was indeed governed under ICSID’s jurisdiction.17
The Tribunal issued its Award on September 28, 2007, holding that
Argentina had “breached the fair and equitable standard” along with the “Umbrella
Clause” of the BIT and issuing damages to Sempra.18 More specifically, the
Tribunal first determined that the Licensees’ rights and designations warranted
their entitlement to calculate the PPI adjustments that Argentina had disallowed.19
The Tribunal next decided that Sempra enjoyed a right to maintain its calculation
of tariffs in USD – a “central feature of the tariff regime” that Argentina had
discontinued.20 The Tribunal then held that while Argentina had not explicitly
breached the “standard of protection established in Article VI(1) of the BIT”, its
newly adopted measures (circa 2001-2002) had “substantially changed the legal
and business framework under which [Sempra’s] investment” was made.21 As
such, the Tribunal held that Argentina had violated the “fair and equitable
14

See id.
Id.
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Sempra at n.1 at 7.
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See id.
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See id.
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Id.
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Sempra at n.1 at 7.
15

FOREIGN DECISIONAL LAW ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

435

treatment standard of Article II(2)(a) [and the Umbrella Clause] of the BIT.”22
Objecting to this decision, Argentina submitted a request for annulment, along
with a stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s award, on January 25, 2008.23
The award was “provisionally stayed” on January 30, 2008, upon which an
ad hoc committee (“Committee”) was convened to consider Argentina’s
annulment application.24 In response to Sempra’s request to “lift the stay of
enforcement” of the Tribunal’s award, the Committee decided to continue the stay
until its hearing of the parties’ oral arguments on December 8, 2008.25 On March 5,
2009, the Committee prolonged the stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s award,
stipulating that Argentina place $75 million USD in escrow.26 According to this
ruling, if Argentina failed to fulfill this requirement within 120 days, Sempra could
request that the stay be terminated.27 On May 13, 2009, after Argentina neglected
to offer any sort of escrow agreement, Sempra asked that the Committee lift the
stay.28 Finally, after numerous disputes between the parties regarding various
attachment risks and contingencies, the Committee “terminated the stay of
enforcement” of the Tribunal’s award and “dismiss[ed] Argentina’s argument that
the placing of funds in escrow . . . would cause prohibitive cost[s] and create an
‘unacceptable risk of attachment to Argentina.’”29 After months of deliberation, the
Committee finally issued its “Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for
Annulment of the Award” on June 29, 2010.

22

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 8.
24
Id. at 1.
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Id. at 2.
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See Sempra at n.1 at 2.
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See id.
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See id. at 4.
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Id. at 5.
23
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III.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

A.

The Argentine Republic’s Arguments
Argentina raised four separate arguments in its application for

annulment.30 First, Argentina contended that the Tribunal had been improperly
constituted under Article 52(1)(a) of the ICSID Convention.31 Argentina then
insisted that the Tribunal had “manifestly exceeded its powers” in violation of
Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention.32 Third, Argentina argued that the
Tribunal had seriously departed “from a fundamental rule of procedure” in
violation of Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention.33 Finally, Argentina
maintained that the Tribunal’s award failed to identify the reasoning behind its
provisions as required under Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention.34
Argentina’s primary claim asserted that the Tribunal had “committed a
manifest excess of powers” in its failure to apply Article XI of the BIT in its
analysis.35 In essence, Argentina argued, the Tribunal’s determination that
Argentina’s economic distress could not properly be classified as a “state of
necessity under customary international law,” (Article 25 of the International Law
Commission (“ILC”) Articles) led to an impermissible failure to “undertake further
judicial review under Article XI” of the BIT.36 Here, Argentina asserted, the
Tribunal overlooked the significant differences between Article XI of the BIT and
the “state of necessity under customary international law.”37 Those differences
30

See id. at 8.
See Sempra at n.1 at 8.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
Id. at 19.
36
Sempra at n.1 at 19.
37
Id.
31
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involve the “nature, . . . operation, . . . content, scope, . . . and effects” of Article XI
of the BIT as a “special conventional rule” and the “state of necessity” as a
“general rule.”38 As such, the “state of necessity” is subordinate to Article XI of
the BIT.39 Argentina asserted that the Tribunal made “manifest errors of law in
equating Article XI of the BIT with the state of necessity under customary
international law” –mistakes that are “sufficiently serious” to constitute a
“manifest excess of powers in accordance with Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID
Convention.”40
Argentina also argued that in failing to recognize the “self-judging nature”
of Article XI of the BIT and refusing to “perform a substantive review” of
Argentina’s financial measures, the Tribunal demonstrated a “manifest excess of
powers.”41 Argentina insisted that the Tribunal incorrectly substituted Article XI of
the BIT with the “state of necessity under customary international law,” and
neglected to acknowledge the fundamental operational, contextual, and
consequential differences between the two doctrines.42 According to the
Argentinean government, Article XI of the BIT was applicable to its actions to
restore its economy’s financial solvency in 2001-2002.43 Given Article XI’s selfjudging nature, the Tribunal had a “duty to defer to Argentina’s decision to take
measures to maintain public order and protect its essential security interests.”44 The
Tribunal’s failure to adhere to this duty constituted a “manifest excess of powers”
and thus rendered its award subject to annulment.45
Argentina next contended that the Tribunal’s award warranted annulment
because it did not explicitly delineate its reasoning pursuant to Article 52(1)(e) of

38

Id. at 20.
Id.
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Id. at 21-22.
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Sempra at n.1 at 22.
42
Id.
43
See id.
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Id. at 23.
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the ICSID Convention.46 First, Argentina claimed, the Tribunal did not explain
why it relied exclusively on “the requirements of the state of necessity under
customary international law.”47 The Tribunal also did not establish its grounds for
equating Article XI of the BIT with Article 25 of the ILC Articles.48 The Tribunal
vaguely reasoned that the “lack of a definition of ‘essential security interests’ of
Article XI of the BIT led to the application” of Article 25 of the ILC Articles,
however, it failed to explain why.49 As such, inferred Argentina, the Tribunal did
not disclose its reasoning behind its award decision, as required by Article 52(1)(e)
of the ICSID Convention, and its determination was therefore subject to
annulment.50
B.

Sempra Energy International’s Arguments
Sempra maintained its initial rejection of Argentina’s assertions and

insisted that the Tribunal did not engage in a manifest excess of powers through its
disregard of Article XI of the BIT.51 Sempra argued that the Tribunal’s
interpretation of Article XI of the BIT was appropriate and that its determination
that “Argentina had means available other than the Emergency Law to address its
economic crisis” was proper and correct.52 According to Sempra, the Tribunal’s
conclusion that Article XI lacked the requisite clarity for application to the
circumstances at hand was well founded.53 In fact, Sempra asserted, the Tribunal
provided several explanations regarding its interpretation of Article XI of the

46

See Sempra at n.1 at 23.
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Id. at 24.
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See Sempra at n.1 at 24.
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See id.
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BIT.54 First, the Tribunal stressed that the BIT’s “object and purpose” necessitated
a “narrow interpretation of Article XI.”55 The Tribunal next reasoned that Article
XI lacked a definition of the terms “essential security interests” or “necessary.”56
The Tribunal then explained that “Article XI reflect[ed] customary international
law” and that the use of applicable international rules of law is appropriate when
BIT provisions are unclear, undefined, or indicative of “customary international
law.”57 Thus, according to Sempra, the Tribunal properly rejected Argentina’s
defense stemming from Article XI of the BIT for two primary reasons. First, the
hastily enacted Emergency Law was not necessary to “maintain ‘public order’ or
protect Argentina’s ‘essential security interests.’”58 Second and most importantly,
“there were other means available” to achieve these economic goals.59 Attributing
to the Tribunal the task of determining “whether the Emergency Law was the
‘only’ alternative to address the economic crisis,” Sempra indicated that the
conclusion of the Tribunal suggested that Argentina had failed to supply
“‘convincing evidence that the events were out of control or had become
unmanageable.”60 Sempra went further to maintain that the Tribunal, in concluding
that Argentina itself had contributed to its economic crisis, had based its Article XI
finding on a “general principle of law.”61
Sempra acknowledged that more specific “‘treaty regime[s]’ should
‘prevail over more general rules of customary law,’” yet maintained that because
the text of the BIT failed to offer the Tribunal with adequate guidance, the
Tribunal had appropriately “considered customary international law” the most
apposite means to “interpret the BIT provision.”62 While Article XI of the BIT is

54
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restricted to “maintenance of peace, ‘essential security interests,’ and public
order,” Article 25 of the ILC Articles requires that the issue at hand “be an
‘essential interest of the State.’”63 According to Sempra’s explanation of the two
laws, Article XI of the BIT “is not more expansive than customary law.”64 Sempra
insisted that rather than simply refraining from the application of Article XI, the
Tribunal had “interpreted the provision as requiring a State invoking it to satisfy
the same conditions as required to invoke the plea of necessity under customary
law.”65 In its analysis of the applicability of Article XI, the Tribunal determined
that the circumstances under which Article XI can be invoked are identical to
“those required by customary international law.”66 According to the Tribunal,
Sempra argued, Argentina had simply failed to submit evidence proving the
existence of those conditions. “No excess of powers, let alone any manifest excess
of power [was] involved.”67
Finally, Sempra maintained that Article XI is not self-judging and that the
Tribunal had provided adequate, “lucid, and consistent” reasons for its
determinations.68 As indicated by Sempra, the Tribunal’s explanations “clearly
show[ed]” the reasoning behind its four major conclusions.69 First, the Tribunal
decided that Article XI failed to provide or describe the “legal elements and
conditions necessary for its application.70 Second, the Tribunal reasoned that the
review of equivalent or comparable “rules of customary law” was compulsory in
this instance.71 Third, the Tribunal found that the lack of clarity in Article XI of the
BIT required a review of whether a pertinent application of “state of necessity

63

Id. at 27.
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Id. at 28.
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Sempra at n.1 at 28.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Sempra at n.1 at 28.
64

FOREIGN DECISIONAL LAW ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

441

under customary law” was used.72 Finally, the Tribunal concluded that both
statutes were “customary” and essentially interchangeable.73
IV.

THE COMMITTEE’S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Committee ultimately determined that the Tribunal’s award should be

annulled in its entirety based upon its exhibition of a “manifest excess of powers”
(in violation of Article 52(1)(B) of the ICSID Convention) in its decision regarding
the inapplicability of Article XI of the BIT.74 While the Committee acknowledged
the mootness of Argentina’s other contentions, given its acceptance of Argentina’s
primary argument insisting upon the Tribunal’s exercise of a “manifest excess of
powers,” it agreed to address these other contentions “for the sake of
completeness.”75
In analyzing Argentina’s “serious error of law” claim, the Committee
recognized that a “serious error of law is not in itself a ground for annulment under
Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention” unless it is of an “egregious nature.”76
Here, however, the Committee’s conclusion that the Tribunal had committed a
“manifest excess of powers” precluded any inquiry regarding error as to the
application of relevant law.77 In addressing Argentina’s claim regarding the lack of
reasoning for the Tribunal’s award, the Committee indicated that it was clear that
the Tribunal had endeavored to provide a “detailed account of its reasoning”
regarding “necessity under customary international law.”78 The Committee, in
considering the Tribunal’s deliberation process, determined that the Tribunal had
allotted an appropriate amount of attention to the comparison between Article XI

72

Id.
Id.
74
Id. at 29.
75
Id.
76
Sempra at n.1 at 29-30.
77
Id. at 30.
78
Id.
73
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of the BIT and Article 25 of the ILC Articles.79 As such, the Tribunal’s conclusion
that Article 25 represents a “fair expression” of customary law and that the
Article’s stipulated conditions were necessary for “invoking an ‘essential security
interest’ under the BIT” was sufficiently reasoned.80 The Tribunal’s explanation
regarding the applicability of the “criteria found in customary international law,”
given the BIT’s failure to address the required legal components for the
“invocation of a state of necessity,” was clear and explicitly stated.81 Rejecting
Argentina’s contention regarding the self-judging nature of Article XI of the BIT,
the Committee held that the Tribunal appropriately disregarded Argentina’s
discretion in its attempt to preserve public order and “protect essential security
interests.”82
Despite Argentina’s multiple failed contentions, the Committee affirmed
its claim that the Tribunal had impermissibly failed to apply Article XI of the BIT
and, as such, had engaged in a “manifest excess of powers” – an offense that
rendered the Tribunal’s award annullable.83 According to the Committee, where a
BIT supplies the pertinent treaty language, “it is necessary first and foremost to
apply the provisions of the BIT.”84 As such, the BIT represents applicable law and
must not be overlooked.85 Article XI of the BIT indicates that the “Treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance
of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or
restoration of international peace or security, or the [p]rotection of its own
essential interests.”86

79

See id. at 31.
Id. at 30-31.
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Sempra at n.1 at 31.
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In considering the language of the BIT, the Committee determined that the
treaty is not expressly self-judging on its face.87 The Tribunal had contradicted
itself in its interpretation of Article XI by acknowledging the ability of an
economic emergency to be included within the context of Article XI yet denying
the Article’s self-judging nature.88 According to the Committee, the Tribunal did
not even “deem itself to be required, or even entitled, to consider the applicability
of Article XI.”89 The Tribunal’s reference to and use of Article 25 of the ILC
Articles as an example of customary international law and guidance as to the
proper interpretation of terms within the BIT was reasonable.90 However, it was
neither equitable nor sensible for the Tribunal to use Article 25 to effectively
preempt Article XI of the BIT.91
The Committee also struck down the Tribunal’s decision to equate Article
25 with Article XI.92 A direct comparison of the Articles demonstrated material
differences, and as such, Article 25 certainly should not have been used as
guidance in the Tribunal’s interpretation of the terms used in Article XI.93 “The
most that can be said is that certain words or expressions are the same or
similar.”94 While it is certainly true that “the BIT does not prescribe who is to
determine whether the measures in question are or were ‘necessary’ for” the
salvaging of Argentina’s floundering economy (i.e. whether Article XI is “selfjudging”), if the “measures in question are properly judged to be ‘necessary,’ then
there is no breach of any Treaty obligation.”95

87

See id.
See id.
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Id. at 41.
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Typically, an “excess of powers” claim is properly supported where it is

alleged that the Tribunal failed to apply to relevant law.96 The Committee found
that the following sentence of the Tribunal’s award demonstrated the Tribunal’s
failure to consider and apply the appropriate law:
Since the Tribunal has found above that the crisis invoked
does not meet the customary law requirements of Article 25
of the Articles on State Responsibility, it concludes that
necessity or emergency is not conducive in this case to the
preclusion of wrongfulness, and that there is no need to
undertake a further judicial review under Article XI given
that this Article does not set out conditions different from
customary law in such regard.97
In effect, the Tribunal held that Article 25 effectively “trumps” Article XI with
regard to the “mandatory legal norm” that must be applied in such a
circumstance.98 As such, the Tribunal essentially embraced Article 25 of the ILC
Articles as the proper applicable law, in a complete dismissal of Article XI of the
BIT. In doing so, the Tribunal “made a fundamental error in identifying and
applying” the relevant law.99 This error, a failure to recognize and employ the
proper controlling law, “constitutes an excess of powers within the meaning of the
ICSID Convention.”100
This determination alone, however, did not require the annulment of the
Tribunal’s award.101 The Committee held that in order for an “excess of powers”
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claim to necessitate annulment, the excess must have been “manifest.”102 In this
case, the Tribunal’s conclusion that there “‘[was] no need to undertake a further
judicial review under Article XI’” was an obvious dereliction of the Tribunal’s
duty to inquire sufficiently as to the Treaty’s applicability.103 The Tribunal formed
this determination on its baseless assertion that the language of the BIT was
“somehow not legitimated by the dictates of customary international law.”104
In conclusion, the Committee determined that because of the Tribunal’s
exercise of a “manifest excess of powers,” its award was subject to annulment
under the ICSID Convention.105 The Committee expressly annulled the Tribunal’s
award and ordered Sempra to reimburse Argentina for its total ICSID
expenditures.106
V.

CONCLUSIONS
The case of Sempra Energy International v. Argentina is a prime example

of the importance of a tribunal’s thorough analysis and resulting application of
relevant law, particularly where an existing BIT provides pertinent language
regarding the settlement of potential disputes. The annulment of such a large award
due to rather easily avoidable substantive errors imposes hardship on both parties.
Furthermore, this case demonstrates the necessity of a check on the powers of
arbitration tribunals. The convening of an ad hoc committee allows for an
impartial review of a tribunal decision and enables an independent decisional body
to identify any glaring errors or abuses of discretion. This measure grants losing
parties a course of redress in response to a tribunal’s improper granting of an
award. Furthermore, establishing a supervisory entity within ICSID steers the
review of a tribunal’s decision away from the courts, essentially preserving
102
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Id. at 46.
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arbitrational authority and avoiding any exacerbation of the already tenuous
relationship between arbitral tribunals and the courts.

